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Abstract: Existing literature has identified domestic restrictive monetary policy and 
deteriorating funding conditions as the predominant factors explaining the increase in net 
interoffice accounts of global banks, that is, the net liabilities of parent offices due to their 
related foreign offices. The purpose of this research is twofold. Firstly, it quantifies the 
responsiveness of net interoffice accounts to variations in different types of domestic 
funding. Secondly, the paper assesses whether the relationship between net interoffice 
accounts and domestic policy-steered rates depends on cross-sectional differences in the 
funding structure of global banks. Using US banks’ balance sheets data collected by the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, the results highlight the importance of 
domestic repo borrowings in explaining net interoffice accounts, especially for larger 
banks during the crisis. On the other hand, a negative relationship between policy rates and 
net interoffice accounts is observed only for those global banks with a relatively higher 
share of repo borrowings. 
Keywords: US global banks; bank funding; monetary policy; repurchase agreements;  
panel data 
JEL Classification: F33; F34; F42; G21 
 
1. Introduction 
The current dimension of international banking has no historical precedents. The great majority of 
large modern banking groups have an institutional structure that goes beyond national borders: global 
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banks hold more than $10 trillion assets through their foreign-related offices. The drivers of banking 
internationalization, through the establishment of affiliates, branches, and/or subsidiaries abroad 1, 
have changed considerably over the years, especially since the 1970s. Before the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, the growth in international banking activities was primarily driven by the need  
to support colonial expansion and to facilitate and finance trade and investments abroad [1]. Also, the 
opening-up of foreign facilities could allow banks to take advantage of more favorable foreign 
regulations and taxes, expand their activities by attracting local customers, and foster capital flows 
from high to low-savings countries. 
In the last 30 years, banking internationalization has been greatly affected by financial 
liberalization, which has enabled foreign offices to engage in varied and more complex operations on 
behalf of the parent bank, such as currency carry trade activities [2–4] and the settlement of currency 
positions in the FX markets [5]. Also, foreign offices have allowed banks to hold a more diversified 
and less volatile portfolio on a consolidated basis [6–9]. 
More recently, the possibility of exploiting an internal capital market has been found to be an 
additional advantage enjoyed by global banks. De Haas and Lelyveld [10] show that parent offices 
reallocate capital among foreign subsidiaries depending on the phase of their business cycles, 
stimulating, in this way, cross-border contagion of shocks. Subsidiaries are found to react to balance 
sheet expansions of related institutions of the same banking group located elsewhere by enhancing their 
credit supply in the host country. However, during the latest financial crisis, De Haas and Lelyveld [11] 
find that subsidiaries have been affected by the financial instability experienced at the group-level and 
internal capital markets have been used by parents to import liquidity from subsidiaries. 
Parent offices themselves can also benefit from borrowing through internal capital markets, as this 
allows them to cushion against domestic adverse monetary policy or funding shocks. Cetorelli and 
Goldberg [12] show that US parent offices increase their net liabilities due to their related foreign 
offices in response to negative monetary policy shocks, impairing the effectiveness of the domestic 
bank lending transmission channel. Cetorelli and Goldberg [13] have further showed that, during the 
latest crisis, US-located offices have resorted to borrowing from internal capital markets in order to 
avoid considerable deleveraging when hit by funding shocks. 
It is only recently that net interoffice accounts have attracted notable attention, especially in those 
studies aimed at assessing cross-border contagion (such as [14] and [15]) and global imbalances [16]. 
This measure was formally used by Hattori and Shin [3] to understand the scale of carry trade activities 
of foreign banks located in Japan, especially during the years in which the Bank of Japan engaged in 
quantitative easing (2001–2006). More recently, [17] have also looked at net interoffice positions of 
global banks when investigating the behavior of foreign banks located in the US during the dollar 
funding crisis in 2009. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims to investigate the sensitivity of net interoffice 
accounts to different types of domestic funding, i.e., obtained through repurchase agreements, 
interbank markets, and private sector deposits. In this regard, this research represents a first attempt to 
link net interoffice accounts to disentangled sources of domestic funding. Cetorelli and Goldberg [12] 
find significant responses of global banks’ borrowings from internal capital markets to funding shocks; 
                                                 
1  Unless otherwise mentioned, throughout this paper these three entities are defined collectively as “foreign offices.” 
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however, they aggregate all banks’ liabilities due to both domestic and foreign sectors. De Haas and 
Lelyveld [11] have looked at different sources of funding, such as wholesale debt; however, they 
investigated their effect on lending of parent and foreign offices rather than on net interoffice accounts. 
Understanding which type of domestic funding dry-up might induce global banks to increase their 
borrowings from related offices can help to better predict the extent of the cross-border propagation  
of shocks. 
Secondly, this paper explores whether cross-sectional differences in funding through repurchase 
agreements of global banks result in heterogeneous responses of net interoffice positions to domestic 
monetary policy. This analysis is motivated by the intention to clarify the puzzling behavior of US 
banks’ net interoffice accounts observed during the latest crisis. Indeed, previous findings suggest that 
net interoffice accounts fall during a period of monetary expansion; they reached their historical high 
of $583 billion in the last quarter of 2008, in the same quarter in which total borrowings of depositary 
institutions from the Federal Reserve reached the unprecedented level of $667 billion and the effective 
federal funds rate stood at only 0.2%. As showed by Cetorelli and Goldberg [13], during the crisis US 
global banks have increased their net interoffice debt because of deteriorating domestic credit 
conditions. It is, however, of interest to understand whether, as a general result, the funding structure 
of global banks should be taken into account when considering the responsiveness of global banks to 
monetary policy stances. Global banks that rely more on wholesale funding, for instance, might adjust 
their borrowings via internal capital markets according to the extent of liquidity in domestic  
non-deposit credit sources. An increase in the policy-steered rate, featured by inflating asset prices, 
might, indeed, lead those global banks with a high share of secured funding to borrow less from their 
internal capital markets. This would result in a negative relationship between the federal funds rate and 
net interoffice borrowings. 
The two aims of the paper are pursued with the estimation of a two-step Generalized Methods of 
Moments dynamic regression [18] and [19] and a Panel Threshold Regression Model [20] respectively. 
Both empirical approaches use bank-level balance sheet information contained in the quarterly 
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (Call report) collected from the Federal Deposit and 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) database (https://www2.fdic.gov/call_tfr_rpts/). 
The results show that net interoffice accounts increase when global banks reduce their borrowings 
from both the private sector (via sight deposits) and repo markets. This effect is more pronounced 
during the period 2007–2010 and for the largest 15 global banks. As expected, the effect of the federal 
funds rate on net interoffice accounts ceases to be significant during the crisis. In the second part of the 
empirical analysis it is found that an increase in the policy rate causes net interoffice accounts to 
increase for those banks that have a low repo funding-to-assets ratio. On the other hand, an increase  
in the policy rate causes net interoffice accounts to fall for those banks that have a high repo  
funding-to-assets ratio. These results point to a tight relationship between net interoffice accounts and 
collateral values: those global banks that have a relatively higher share of repo borrow more from their 
foreign counterparts whenever their collateral value deteriorates and financing via collateralised 
markets becomes more costly. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a number of stylized facts that support the 
following empirical analyses and reports two sets of regression estimates. First, it presents the 
estimates of a dynamic panel regression in which net interoffice accounts are explained primarily by 
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US global banks’ balance sheets’ funding variables. Second, it reports the estimates of a threshold 
model aimed at assessing whether cross-sectional variations in funding structure result in different 
behavior of global banks vis-à-vis domestic monetary policy. Section 3 concludes. 
2. Data Analysis and Model Estimations 
2.1. Stylized Facts on Net Interoffice Accounts in the US 
In the US globalization is a predominant feature of the banking sector: 17 of the 20 largest banks 
had foreign-related offices in 2007. Foreign operations of US banks are mostly conducted by their 
branches, which are domestically regulated and report on a quarterly basis to the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC, form 030, US). Among all non-resident counterparties,  
foreign-related offices are the largest lenders to US financial institutions: in 2011 over 50% of gross 
foreign-held debt was due to own foreign offices. In net terms, domestically-located offices of US 
global banks are net borrowers to their foreign offices. As shown in Figure 1, net interoffice accounts, 
equal to the difference between interoffice liabilities and interoffice assets, are made up mainly of 
interoffice liabilities, while interoffice assets have historically been relatively low. 
The biggest increase in interoffice liabilities of US banks was over the period 2002 to 2008, up by 
550%. There are a number of possible factors that could potentially explain this trend: restrictive 
domestic monetary policy, carry trade activities, unsynchronized business cycles, and domestic 
funding conditions. However, a closer look at the stylized facts suggests that funding availability of US 
banks has been the most prominent factor in explaining the sustained increase in interoffice liabilities. 
First, the global dimension of the latest crisis weakens the hypothesis of capital re-allocation among 
offices located in countries experiencing different phases of the business cycle [10]. Europe and the 
UK, the two non-offshore foreign banking systems to which US banks have the largest inter-office 
debts, for instance, were experiencing economic downturns as well. 2  Second, the carry trades 
explanation [3] could not justify this increase either, given that worldwide interbank interest rates have 
been converging and exchange rate volatilities increasing, resulting in large FX position unwinds [21]. 
Policy interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and the UK, for instance, have remained 
positive or null during the whole crisis. Third, interoffice liabilities could not have been stimulated by 
a restrictive domestic monetary policy: from late 2007 they have kept rising despite the rapid and 
drastic cut in the federal funds rate and several emergency liquidity injections by the Fed. Figure 2 
below shows the evolution of interoffice liabilities in relation to the federal funds rate: over the great 
moderation period, characterized by low interest rates and steady credit expansion, the growth in 
interoffice liabilities was rather contained. In late 2004, however, interoffice liabilities started to 
escalate following the gradual rise in the federal funds rate. This evidence is in line with the argument 
that when domestic monetary policy is tighter, liquidity flows from foreign-related offices to parents 
are higher [12]. However, the crisis period has shown a reversal in the relationship between these two 
series: interoffice liabilities have kept on increasing, notwithstanding the low levels of the federal 
funds rate. 
                                                 
2  The majority of interoffice liabilities of US banks are owed to offices located in off-shore centres. Thus, the exact 
location from which the debt originates cannot be exactly established (see [2]). 
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Figure 1. Net interoffice accounts of US global banks. (Source: Federal Reserve Board and 
Call Report. Note: Net Interoffice Accounts have been computed by the author as the 
difference between interoffice liabilities and interoffice assets.) 
 
Figure 2. Interoffice liabilities and the Federal Funds Rate. Source: Federal Reserve Board 
and Call Report. 
The disconnection between interoffice liabilities and policy interest rates during the crisis can be 
attributed to disruptions in funding markets. The level of the federal funds rate, indeed, does not yield 
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adequate information on the ease of obtaining funding from sources other than the central bank. In 
particular, during the crisis, the Fed’s non-conventional interventions, i.e., in the form of considerable 
liquidity injections, pushed the federal funds rate to historically low levels while funding from other 
sources was disrupted. Falling asset prices and difficulties in pricing some illiquid securities held on 
the banks’ balance sheets had, indeed, notable consequences on both secured and unsecured borrowings. 
The tensions in the unsecured credit markets, particularly in interbank markets, since the outburst of 
the subprime crisis were mainly generated by the increase in counterparty risk, which resulted in rising 
margin requirements and widening of Libor-OIS spreads [22]. As shown in Figure 3a below, when 
unsecured funding illiquidity resulted in considerable spikes in the Libor and Libor-OIS spreads, 
changes in interoffice liabilities have followed a similar path to that of those spreads. Indeed, the peak 
of the interoffice liabilities in 2008 coincided exactly with the historically high level of the LIBOR-OIS 
spread, which reached over 3.5% in the last quarter of 2008. Interoffice liabilities started to decrease 
only in the second quarter of 2009 when the Libor-OIS spread in the US returned to levels below 1%. 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 3. Interoffice liabilities and the Libor and 3M Libor-OIS spreads (a) and 
borrowings from the FED (b). Source: Federal Reserve Board, Datastream and Call Report. 
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Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program. With the TALF, conditions in funding 
markets started to ease as banks were granted additional funds of $1 trillion, together with the possibility of 
borrowing from the Fed by using a much wider class of collateral (including mortgage-backed ABSs). 
Borrowing through repurchase agreements, which constitute a prominent source of funding for US 
banks, were also severely hit by the turmoil as activity in repo markets dried up and repo transactions 
were limited to those involving very short-term maturities and highest-quality collateral. As can be 
seen in Figure 4 below, until late 2006, interoffice liabilities and securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase (levels) were moving at a similar pace. Afterwards, repo borrowings by US global banks 
have slowed down, keeping steady at about $300 billion until sample-end while net interoffice 
liabilities have kept on increasing. In particular, since 2006 the quarterly growth rates of the two  
series have moved in opposite directions, suggesting a certain degree of substitution between the two 
funding sources. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4. Interoffice liabilities and securities sold under agreements to repurchase:  
(a) levels; (b) quarterly growth rates. Source: Call Report. 
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2.2. Empirical Investigation 
2.2.1. Variables and Sample 
The econometric analysis presented in this paper is centered on several bank-level variables 
available from the quarterly Report of Condition and Income, or Call Report, collected by the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 
A bank is defined as global whenever it has non-zero values of net due to/from own foreign offices, 
Edge and Agreement subsidiaries, and IBFs (Schedule RC-H 3) at some point of the chosen sample.  
The dependent variable is Net Interoffice Accounts, nioa, which is constructed as the difference  
between “due to” and “due from” own foreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidiaries, and IBFs so 
that it takes on a positive (negative) value whenever parent offices are net borrowers (lenders) vis-à-vis 
their foreign offices. 
The descriptive statistics of nioa reported in Table 1 show that despite the fact that in 15 years the 
number of US global banks has almost halved (201 in 1995 vs. 113 in 2010), aggregated net 
borrowings owed to foreign offices have more than tripled from 2002 to sample-end. In 2008 nioa 
reached its historical high of $583 billion; in the two following years it diminished slightly but still 
remained higher than the levels observed before 2006. There is large cross-sectional variation in nioa, 
as can be noticed from the very low values of mean and median and very large minimum and 
maximum values, more marked towards the end of the sample. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for net interoffice accounts (NIOA), $Bn. 
Year Sum Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. Obs. 
1995 63.1 0.3 0.0 −6.0 8.9 1.2 201 
1996 23.0 0.1 0.0 −16.5 7.1 1.6 188 
1997 43.6 0.3 0.0 −12.5 11.5 2.3 152 
1998 62.0 0.5 0.0 −4.2 8.1 1.5 134 
1999 81.5 0.6 0.0 −3.0 11.9 1.8 131 
2000 110.4 0.9 0.0 −3.4 20.7 2.7 128 
2001 96.0 0.8 0.0 −3.7 18.8 2.8 122 
2002 99.1 0.9 0.0 −7.4 21.2 3.0 116 
2003 140.4 1.3 0.0 −7.4 16.3 3.6 111 
2004 197.9 1.8 0.0 −9.0 48.4 6.4 107 
2005 255.4 2.1 0.0 −30.2 65.1 8.5 124 
2006 378.4 3.3 0.1 −8.2 81.0 11.7 115 
2007 513.0 4.4 0.1 −12.1 87.7 14.6 117 
2008 583.0 5.0 0.1 −10.8 116.5 18.5 117 
2009 459.6 4.0 0.1 −13.1 103.5 14.0 116 
2010 346.9 3.1 0.1 −73.2 111.6 16.3 113 
Source: Call report. Notes: Net interoffice accounts refer to the FDIC series “Net due to own foreign offices, 
Edge and Agreement subsidiaries and IBFs” (ffiec code rcon2941) minus “Net due from own foreign offices, 
Edge and Agreement subsidiaries and IBFs” (ffiec code rcon2163). Figures relate to amounts reported in the 
fourth quarter of the corresponding year. 
                                                 
3  In particular, banks with foreign offices complete the FFIEC 031 reporting form, containing the Schedule RC-H. 
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As shown in Table 2, the larger the global bank (i.e., in terms of total assets) the more it borrows in 
net terms from its foreign offices; in particular, in 2008 70% of nioa was due from the six largest 
banks with total assets of more than $200 billion. The bottom of Table 2 shows the nioa-to-assets ratio 
by bank size in order to gauge the relative importance of nioa in financing assets. The six largest 
global banks have a positive nioa, which depicts a relatively contained variability around the mean: 
between 2% and 14% of assets are financed by nioa. Medium-sized banks, on the other hand, have an 
average nioa-to-assets ratio equal to 0.073 but the degree of heterogeneity is more important. For some 
banks, nioa are a very important source of funding, financing up to 31% of assets. Medium-sized 
banks do not depict large net outflows to their related offices: the largest negative nioa is equal to only 
0.08. Small banks, on the other hand, have the highest heterogeneity in terms of relative importance in 
nioa as a source of funding: while on average only 5.5% of assets are financed by nioa, this source of 
funding can be extremely important for some banks, going up to 80% of total assets. Among all global 
banks, small banks depict important net lending to their foreign related offices via their internal capital 
markets: their largest negative nioa is equal to 0.44. 
Table 2. Nioa and bank size as of the first quarter of 2008. 
Total Assets Range ($bn) Nioa Number of Banks % of Total 
>200 304 6 70 
>100 and ≤200 78 7 18 
≤100 54 60 12 
 Nioa-to-Assets 
Total Assets Range ($bn) Mean Max. Min. 
>200 0.064 0.14 0.02 
>100 and ≤200 0.073 0.31 −0.08 
≤100 0.055 0.80 −0.44 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from FFIEC. 
The quarterly unbalanced panel considered in the estimation contains 102 global banks over the 
period 1995 to 2010; the banks included in the sample are those for which at least seven years of 
consecutive data points of nioa are available. 
The bank-level balance sheet variables considered primarily capture the ease of obtaining funding 
from a variety of channels. Funding of domestic offices is broken down into borrowings in the form of 
domestic inter-bank debt, private sector deposits, and repurchase agreements. The former two types of 
funding are further classified into demand and term deposits. Funding availability at foreign offices is 
proxied by total deposits. The effective federal funds rate is used to keep close track of the central 
bank’s steered policy rate. A number of macroeconomic variables were initially incorporated to the 
analysis to capture other possible determinants of nioa, such as interest rate differentials, exchange 
rates, and real GDP, but they were not found to significantly explain changes in nioa over the sample 
considered. Details and summary statistics on all the variables kept in the analysis are reported in Table 3. 
Total deposits held by foreign offices have expanded greatly over the years, reflecting the growing 
importance of banking globalization: they quadrupled over the period 2001–2009 reaching $1.3 trillion. 
Funding obtained by domestic offices from domestic markets comes mainly from transaction deposits 
of the private sector ($383 billion in 2009) and securities sold under repo agreements ($256 billion in 
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2009). Funding though interbank deposits has increased notably over the years, reaching a total of 
almost $50 billion in 2009 (transactional and non-transactional confounded). 
Table 3. Summary statistics and source of other balance-sheet variables, $Bn. 
Total  Source Code Availability
  Total deposits at foreign offices Call Report rcfn2200 1995–2010 
1995 226.89   
2001 469.36   
2009 1301.43   
  
Non-transaction deposits at domestic offices 
of the private sector 
Call Report rcon2385 1995–2010 
1995 0.08   
2001 1.52   
2009 10.52   
Transaction deposits at domestic offices of 
the private sector 
Call Report rcon2215 1995–2010 
1995 129.52   
2001 250.12   
2009 383.00   
Interbank non-transaction deposits at 
domestic offices 
Call Report rconb552 2001–2010 
1995 -   
2001 5.04   
2009 22.67   
Interbank transaction deposits at  
domestic offices 
Call Report rconb551 2001–2010 
1995 -   
2001 17.28   
2009 25.06   
Securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase at domestic offices (*) 
Call Report rconb995 2002–2010 
1995 -   
2001 128.20   
2009 255.96       
(*) Figures for 2001 refer to those of the first quarter 2002. 
2.2.2. Model Estimation I 
The inference is based on the following autoregressive-distributed lag model: 
itititi
F
tiptijti vrdepnioanioa +α+λΦ+κ+μ+β= ′− ,,,1,, , (1)
where i  is the index for each bank such that Ni ,...,1=  and t  is the time index. The variable nioa 
represents net interoffice accounts and Ftidep ,  are deposits at foreign offices. The vector ti,Φ  mainly 
contains those variables that refer to different sources of funding available to domestic offices: demand 
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and term deposits of both the private sector and domestic banks and collateralized borrowings (i.e., 
under repurchase agreements). tir ,  is the federal funds rate and iα  is the unobserved bank-specific effect. 
Judson and Owen [18] suggest that in a dynamic setting with an unbalanced panel and a small time 
sample, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is the most suitable framework for estimating 
asymptotically efficient estimators. Here the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond two-steps estimator [19] 
has been employed in order to overcome the weak instrument problem that might arise when the 
dependent variable is highly persistent and/or the ratio of the variance associated to the fixed effect to 
the variance of the idiosyncratic error is too large. The standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and the Sargan test is carried out in order to test the validity of 
specification of the estimated model. 
The first column of Table 4 reports the GMM estimates of (1) with a limited set of variables (i.e., 
excluding interbank and repo domestic borrowings), that is, all those series that are available over the 
whole sample 1995–2010 (see Table 2 for details). The second and third columns report the estimates 
of (1) over the samples 2002–2010 and 2007–2010, respectively; the former sample is chosen 
according to the availability of the repo debt and interbank borrowings variables. 
Table 4. GMM Estimation, Dependent variable: nioa. 
Variables Sample 1995–2010 Sample 2002–2010 Sample 2007–2010 
nioat–1 0.830 *** (0.000) 0.833 *** (0.000) 0.259 (0.318) 
Foreign deposits 0.038 *** (0.000) 0.054 *** (0.000) 0.420 ** (0.204) 
Federal funds rate 25323.43 *** (14.59) 91384 *** (25.84) −77270 * (39689) 
Non-transaction deposits 0.548 *** (0.000) 0.565 *** (0.000) 1.679 * (0.860) 
Transaction deposits −0.039 *** (0.000) −0.161 *** (0.000) −0.514 * (0.279) 
Interbank non-transaction deposits - 0.640 *** (0.000) 0.620 (0.710) 
Interbank transaction deposits - 1.183 *** (0.000) 0.221 (1.706) 
Repo debt - −0.068 *** (0.000) −0.554 *** (0.071) 
Cross-sections included 102 92 48 
Sargan test p-value 0.566 0.737 0.939 
Notes: Table 4 reports the estimates of a dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) regression 
where Net Inter-Office Accounts (nioa) is the dependent variable. Standard errors and covariance are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation [23]. Standard errors in parentheses. As in Arellano and Bover [19] 
and Blundell and Bond [24] the instruments used are the lagged differences (for the level equation) and 
lagged levels (for the differenced equation). A two-steps estimator is computed and the fixed effect is 
removed with orthogonal deviations. The Sargan test for over-identifying restriction is distributed according 
to a χ2 distribution. The crisis dummy takes the value of 1 over the period 2007 quarter 3–2010 quarter 4 and 
0 otherwise. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
Availability of deposits available at foreign offices has a positive and significant effect on nioa in 
each of the three regressions; however, during the crisis, the estimated coefficient of foreign deposits is 
much larger and equal to 0.420 compared to 0.038 in the overall sample period. This result implies that 
nioa is positively related to the availability of stable liquidity funding such as deposits available at 
foreign offices. During the crisis, this relationship is even stronger, reflecting an intensified 
redistribution of liquidity among banking groups via internal capital markets; this result is similar to  
the findings by Cetorelli and Goldberg [13]. Moreover, this result supports the possibility of a  
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flight-to-safety effect witnessed during the financial crisis; that is, foreign depositors might have 
switched their deposits away from US branches in favor of domestic banks, triggering a fall in nioa. 
The effect of the federal funds rate is positive and significant over the whole sample: an increase in the 
federal funds rate by 1% increases the average nioa by over $25 billion. This result confirms the 
previous findings that global banks respond to a domestic restrictive monetary policy by importing 
liquidity via their internal capital market. During the crisis, however, this general result does not hold 
anymore: the estimated coefficient of the federal funds rate is negative and marginally significant. This 
result reflects the fact that domestic funding conditions, such as those in repo markets, rather than the 
monetary policy stance, have been an important driver of nioa, notwithstanding the low level of the 
federal funds rate. This result is in line with the findings by De Haas and Lelyveld [11] and is further 
confirmed by the estimated coefficient of repo debt, which is negative and strongly significant in both 
samples. The estimated coefficient suggests a sizable degree of substitution between funding through 
repo and internal capital markets, especially during the crisis, when every $1 fall in repo debt increased 
nioa by $0.56. Therefore, the reduction of liquidity in repo markets, caused by the deterioration of 
banks’ balance sheets and uncertainty about the fundamental value of some assets, has led global 
banks to tap this drop in funding by withdrawing funds from their foreign offices. 
Transaction deposits are also negatively related to evolution in nioa; its estimated coefficient is four 
times larger during the crisis than over the sample 2002–2010 even if it is significant at the 10% level. 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the other types of funding—non-transactional deposits and 
interbank markets—have positive and significant coefficients over the sample 2002–2010. This 
positive relationship can be explained by the fact that not all changes in funding are replaced by nioa. 
As found in De Haas and Lelyveld [11], during stable economic conditions internal capital markets are 
used to redistribute liquidity across the banking group. Therefore, during buoyant economic conditions 
in which savings are high and interbank markets are functioning correctly, the increase in nioa is due 
to liquidity redirection through internal capital markets rather than compensating for the loss of a 
domestic funding source. 
Most of the regression estimates of (1) during 2007–2010 are either not significant or become 
marginally significant. This is probably due to the fact that there are important cross-sectional 
responses in the way nioa was affected during the crisis. Most notably, it could be argued that the large 
degree of substitution between repo debt and nioa could be more important for larger banks that rely 
more on wholesale funding. 
Table 5 below replicates the estimation in the last column of Table 4 by bank size over the period 
2007–2010. The first column reports the estimates of (1) for the four largest banks, those with average 
total assets over $1 trillion; the second and the last columns report the estimates for the banks with 
average assets equal to more than and less than $1 billion, respectively. For larger banks, the increase 
in nioa during the crisis was primarily explained by the contraction in funding from repo markets. In 
the sample of the largest 15 global banks, however, the fall in transaction deposits also significantly 
affects the increase in nioa. Smaller banks, on the other hand, have significantly increased their net 
borrowings from their internal capital market, however, not to respond to a particular domestic funding 
constraint. The increase in nioa for this subset of global banks was motivated by the availability of 
foreign deposits, implying that the liquidity that was imported was mainly driven by either a 
precautionary motive or to restore their balance sheet following increasing defaults. Smaller banks 
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were not affected as much as large banks by the dry-up in wholesale funding markets; however, they 
still needed to raise external funds to cover the losses brought about by nonperforming assets. The 
estimated effect on nioa reflects the increase in uncertainty witnessed in financial markets, translated 
into the greater difficulty for smaller banks of raising additional unsecured funding. 
Table 5. GMM Estimation. Dependent variable: nioa, sample 2007–2010. 
Variables Largest 4 Banks Largest 15 Banks Other Banks 
nioat−1 0.763 *** (0.216) 0.716 *** (0.163) −0.029 (0.082) 
Foreign deposits 0.110 (0.159) 0.140 (0.164) 0.857 *** (0.145) 
Federal funds rate 1799562 (2583567) −19287 (326006) −25767 (11214) 
Non-transaction deposits −0.084 (1.510) 1.234 (0.888) 0.019 (0.150) 
Transaction deposits −0.313 (0.286) −0.376 ** (0.156) 0.223 (0.183) 
Interbank non-transaction deposits 0.525 (0.659) 0.456 (0.482) 0.686 (0.862) 
Interbank transaction deposits −0.326 (2.236) −0.220 (1.683) −0.848 (0.851) 
Repo debt −0.400 *** (0.093) −0.432 *** (0.041) −0.113 (0.128) 
Cross-sections included 4 15 63 
Sargan test p-value 0.565 0.206 0.649 
Notes: Table 5 reports the estimates of a dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) regression 
where Net Inter-Office Accounts (nioa) is the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. Banks are 
ranked by their asset size and then classified as the largest four (assets on average greater than $1 trillion), the 
largest 15 (assets on average greater than $100 billion), or other banks (assets on average less than  
$100 billion). Standard errors and covariance are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation [23]. 
As in Arellano and Bover [19] and Blundell and Bond [24] the instruments used are the lagged differences 
(for the level equation) and lagged levels (for the differenced equation). A two-steps estimator is computed 
and the fixed effect is removed with orthogonal deviations. The Sargan test for over-identifying restriction  
is distributed according to a χ2 distribution. The crisis dummy takes the value of 1 over the period  
2007 quarter 3–2010 quarter 4 and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.05, 
and 0.1 level, respectively. 
2.2.3. Model Estimation II 
In the previous sub-section it has been argued that domestic funding conditions can be important 
determinants of nioa. Estimates from Table 4 point to the existence of a non-linear effect of the federal 
funds rate on nioa, while in Table 5 it has been shown that during the crisis the monetary policy rate 
does not significantly explain nioa. This section aims at shedding some light on whether the impact of 
the federal funds rate on nioa varies across banks depending on their funding structure rather than on 
their size. There is, indeed, still a large heterogeneity of banks in the group of small banks, some of 
which are also highly reliant on wholesale funding. Most notably, the focus will be here on funding 
through securities sold under repo agreements, which constitutes for many global banks an important 
source of funding, and, as shown in Table 4, has a negative and strongly significant effect on nioa. 
However, there are important cross-sectional differences in the ratios of repo funding-to-total assets in 
the considered sample of global banks, which can vary between 0 and 0.5. 
Therefore, it might be interesting to investigate whether when the central bank reduces its steered 
rates to stimulate interbank borrowing and lending during a banking crisis, collateral deterioration 
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leads those global banks that finance a greater share of their assets through repo markets to rely 
relatively more on interoffice borrowings. 
A Panel Threshold Regression Model (PTRM), as proposed by [20], is used to test whether the 
effect of policy rates on nioa differs when accounting for cross-sectional variations in funding through 
repo markets of global banks. The variables are divided by total assets as the focus here is on the 
relative importance of repo in a bank’s funding structure. 
The PTRM estimated has the following form: 
ititittitti
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where I() is an indicator function, ait stands for total assets of bank i at time t, rt is the effective federal 
funds rate at time t, and itrepo  are securities sold under agreements to repurchase at domestic offices of 
bank i at time t. The vector zit  contains regime-independent variables such as the ratio of foreign 
deposits-to-total assets as well as additional regressors to reduce the possibility of spurious 
correlations. 4 itε  is the vector of disturbances of bank i at time t and γ  is the threshold of the variable 
securities sold under agreements to repurchase-to-total assets. Specification (2) allows the coefficient 
of rt to depend on a threshold variable, which is the ratio of repo funding-to-total assets. Table 5 shows 
the regression slope estimates of (2) and the estimated threshold, γ , for the balanced quarterly panel 
over the period 2002 to 2010, which includes 51 global banks. The estimated coefficient of 
))(( γ≤itt a
repoIr  is positive and significant at the 5% significance level, equal to 0.12. This result 
suggests that those banks that finance their assets with a lower share of borrowings through repo 
agreements, equal to 20% or less of their total assets (as found by the estimate of the threshold at the 
bottom of Table 6), adjust their nioa in the same direction of federal funds rates. For this kind of bank, 
then, the general result found in [12] holds: a loosening in domestic monetary policy results in a 
reduction in net borrowings of domestic banks from their foreign affiliates. The estimated coefficient 
of ))(( γ>itt a
repoIr , on the other hand, is negative and significant at the 5% significance level, equal to 
−0.35. That is, banks that finance more than 20% of their assets with borrowing through repo 
agreements react differently to a change in domestic policy rate: a fall in federal funds rate results in an 
increase in nioa. 
This set of results confirms the prediction that those global banks that finance a greater share of 
their assets through repo markets borrow more from their foreign affiliates when their collateral 
deteriorates during a banking crisis. The negative and significant effect of federal funds rates on nioa 
for those banks can be explained as follows. The slow increase in the federal funds rate from 2003 
happened in conjunction with inflating asset prices, which enhanced the value of banks’ collateral. 
During this period, those global banks that were greatly reliant on borrowing from repo markets had 
strong collateral and borrowing from foreign affiliates was diminishing. However, as the federal funds 
rate started to fall dramatically in 2008 and the banking crisis had deteriorated banks’ balance sheets, 
                                                 
4  These regressors include the square and the cube of deposits at foreign offices and repo funding as well as the product 
of these two variables, as in [20]. 
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global banks started borrowing more from their foreign affiliates, given the rising difficulty in borrowing 
from repo markets. Since regression (2) considers the variables normalized by total assets, the results 
in Table 5 might be driven entirely by the asset side of the bank balance sheet for high-repo-funded 
banks, rather than a shift in the nioa. Therefore, for robustness check, Table 7 below reports the two 
sets of estimates of a linear version of (2) in which the variables are not normalized by assets. The 
estimates of the first column refer to the sample of global banks with the highest gross amount of repo 
borrowings; the second column shows the estimates of the model for all other banks. The estimated 
coefficient of the federal funds rate is significant in both instances and is negative for the sample of 
banks with the largest amount of outstanding repo debt and positive for all other banks. 
Table 6. Panel threshold regression estimation. 
Dependent variable: nioa-to-assets   
Regime-dependent variable Repo financing Estimate 
Federal funds rate low  
0.116 **  
[0.049] 
Federal funds rate high  
–0.352 ** 
[0.152] 
Regime-independent variable   Estimate 
Foreign deposits-to-assets - 
0.640 ***  
[0.070] 
Threshold 
γ 0.202 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of a Panel Threshold regression where NIOA-to-assets is the dependent 
variable. In brackets White standard errors, i.e., corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation [23]. 
***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
Table 7. Estimation by repo funding. Dependent variable: nioa. 
Variables Higher Repo Lower Repo 
Foreign deposits 0.354 *** (0.056) 0.263 *** (0.023) 
Federal funds rate −8283027 ** (3680297) 1268646 * (668641) 
Cross-sections included 9 95 
Notes: Table 7 reports the estimates of a Panel Two-Stages EGLS (cross-section random effect) regression 
where Net Inter-Office Accounts (nioa) is the dependent variable and the sample period 2002–2010.  
A constant (unreported) is included in the regressions. Banks are ranked according to their repo borrowings 
as higher (on average greater than $1 billion), and lower repo. Standard errors and covariance are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation [23]. The instruments used are assets and deposits held at foreign 
offices (sight and non-transactional. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.05, and 0.1 
level, respectively.) 
3. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to further understanding the reasons why US banks borrow from their 
foreign offices. The first part of the empirical methodology focuses on banks’ access to domestic 
funding, both from secured and unsecured markets, and its role in explaining changes in net interoffice 
accounts (nioa), that is, the net liabilities of parent banks due to their foreign offices. It is shown that 
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variations in domestic sight deposits and securities sold under repurchase agreements significantly 
affect nioa with a negative sign. Given their highest reliance on wholesale funding, this effect is more 
pronounced for the sample of large banks. However, the US global banks in the sample considered 
have a funding structure that varies considerably across institutions. Therefore, the second part of the 
empirical investigation shows that domestic monetary policy, proxied by the federal funds rate, affects 
positively and significantly net interoffice accounts only for those global banks whose funding 
structure entails relatively less borrowing through repo markets. This result suggests that cross-sectional 
differences in the funding structure of global banks are an important factor to be taken into account 
when investigating the dynamics of interoffice lending and borrowings. 
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